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INTRODUCTION 
Do digital platforms, operated by multinational companies (MNCs), give rise to new 
profit tax bases? Do they support new claims to, or new desirable international allocations of, 
taxing rights with respect to MNC profits? In the last two years, these questions have been 
forcefully raised by bold, new legislative proposals from the UK government,1 the European 
Commission (EC),2 and a number of European national governments including Spain, France, 
Austria, and others.3 These governments have called for the international community to explore 
long-term strategies to reforming international business income taxation, such that taxing right 
over MNC profits could be reallocated to reflect the value contributed by users of digital 
platforms. They also announced the intention to adopt unilateral, “interim solutions” that do not 
require international consensus. These unilateral solutions deploy taxes imposed on revenues 
from various digital services, and are meant to prod nations into multilateral action. While the 
details of the proposed interim taxes vary, a subset of them, bearing sufficient resemblance with 
one another, are now associated with the label “digital services tax” (DST). Because the prospect 
                                                          
1 Her Majesty’s Treasury, Corporate Tax and the Digital Economy: Position Paper (Nov. 2017) 
[hereinafter UK 2017 Paper]; Her Majesty’s Treasury, Corporate Tax and the Digital Economy: Position 
Paper Update (Mar. 2018) [hereinafter UK 2018 Paper]; Her Majesty’s Treasury, Digital Services Tax: 
Consultation (2018) [hereinafter UK DST: Consultation].  
2 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Laying down Rules relating to the 
Corporate Taxation of a Significant Digital Presence, COM (2018) 147 final (Mar. 21, 2018) [hereinafter 
EC Long-Term Proposal]; European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the Common 
System of a Digital Services Tax on Revenues Resulting from the Provision of Certain Digital Services, 
COM (2018) 148 final (Mar. 21, 2018) [hereinafter EC DST Proposal]. 
3 KPMG, Digital economy impact checklist: Update on Digital Services Tax developments in Spain 
(2019); Stephanie Soong Johnston, Austria Proposes 5 Percent Digital Advertising Tax, TAX NOTES (Apr. 
8, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-international/digital-economy/austria-proposes-5-percent-
digital-advertising-tax/2019/04/08/29bc3; Teri Sprackland, Internet Companies to Pay French Digital 
Services Tax in October, TAX NOTES (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/worldwide-tax-
daily/online-sales-taxation/internet-companies-pay-french-digital-services-tax-october/2019/03/07/296qj.   
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of a large group of countries agreeing on the “long-term” reform of international income taxation 
is highly uncertain, the unilateral imposition of the DST by some countries now seems 
unavoidable. Even the government of the United States—home to many of the largest platform 
MNCs that would be subject to the DST—has come to accept the DST’s short-term 
inevitability.4  
There is growing public recognition that digital platforms display distinctive economic 
characteristics. These, according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), include at the minimum (i) network effects that generate market power, 
(ii) two- or multi-sided business models that involve complex pricing choices in profit 
maximization, (iii) negligible marginal cost, and (iv) geographic mobility in the location of 
service delivery and profit recognition.5 However, both in the United States and elsewhere, 
commentaries on DST proposals among both tax practitioners and academics have been 
predominantly negative.6 The proposals are often branded as populist, financially expedient, or 
worse,7 as though no sound policy justification could possibly be offered for them. Tax legal 
scholars have also been quick to point out that the current debate about reforming international 
                                                          
4 Stephanie Soong Johnston, U.S. and France Strike Compromise over Digital Services Tax, 164 TAX 
NOTES FEDERAL 1629 (SEPT. 2, 2019).  
5 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation 
– Interim Report 2018: Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
Project, OECD PUBLISHING, (2018) [hereinafter OECD 2018 Report]. See especially Chapter 2.  
6 See, e.g. Clifford Chance LLP, Missing the Target? The Surprising Scope of the Proposed New EU 
Digital Services Tax, (Mar. 2018); Helge Sigurd, Næss-Schmidt et al., The Proposed EU Digital Services 
Tax: Effects on Welfare, Growth and Revenues, COPENHAGEN ECONOMICS (Sept. 2018); Sean Lowry, 
Congressional Research Service, Digital Services Taxes (DSTs): Policy and Economic Analysis (Feb. 25, 
2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45532.pdf. 
7  Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Zhiyao (Lucy) Lu, The European Union’s Proposed Digital Services Tax: A 
De Facto Tariff, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (Jun. 2018); Bloomberg 
Editorial Board, Europe’s Digital Tax is a Bad Idea, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-04-11/europe-s-digital-tax-is-a-bad-idea (“Doing nothing 
would be better than this”).  
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taxation—including but not limited to advocacy for DST proposals—is highly political.8 The 
salience of political motivations behind DST proposals continues to threaten to overwhelm any 
proper assessment of the substantive policy merits of the tax.  
In this Article, I offer a range of arguments, based on both efficiency and fairness 
considerations, in support of the DST. I believe the arguments are novel in at least four respects. 
First, they are highly distinct from the particular policy justifications for the DST provided by the 
EC, UK and other governments.9 Second, they articulate a set of intuitions, specifically about 
how corporate rent can be attributed to particular geographical locations, that are quite new to 
discussions of international taxation generally. The plausibility of these intuitions deserves 
serious examination in its own right. Third, it will be seen that the traditional international 
income taxation regime does little to acknowledge these intuitions. This means not only that 
DST proposals can advance policy objectives that international income taxation has so far 
missed, but also that it may be a challenge to reform international income taxation to serve the 
same policy objectives. This perspective stands in sharp contrast with a prevalent assumption in 
recent debates about the DST, namely the DST and reform of international income taxation are 
policy substitutes. Fourth, in addition to articulating its basic motivations, I argue that the DST’s 
pragmatic consequences can also be reasonably predicted and may fall well within the range of 
the acceptable.     
                                                          
8 Arthur Cockfield, A digital-tax war is coming to a galaxy not so far, far away, THE GLOBE AND MAIL 
(Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-a-digital-tax-war-is-coming-to-a-
galaxy-not-so-far-far-away/; Ruth Mason, The Digital-Tax Proxy War, MEDIUM (Dec. 2, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@ProfRuthMason/the-digital-tax-proxy-war-1f618a0f8d43.   
9 An important limitation of early academic critiques of DST proposals is that they have considered (and 
dismissed) only the particular arguments offered for the DST in official government announcements—
hardly the place to look for authoritative intellectual exegesis. See, e.g. Itai Grinberg, User Participation 
in Value Creation, 4 BRIT. TAX R. 407 (2018); Johannes Becker & Joachim Englisch, Taxing Where 
Value is Created: What’s “User Involvement“ Got to Do With It? (Oct. 2018).  
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Here is a preview of the arguments. The main case in support of the DST is that it would 
allow location-specific rent (LSR) earned by digital platforms to be captured by the countries in 
which such rent arises. In contrast, the entitlement to a share of such rent is not acknowledged 
under traditional income taxation. This is clearest in two-sided business models that rely on 
cross-side externalities (“indirect network effects”).10 Under the (now standard) economic 
analysis of two-sided businesses, a digital platform can price below marginal cost for services 
provided to users on one side (i.e., providing a subsidy on that side), while making up for that 
loss by charging users on the other side. Suppose the user population on the first side is in one 
country while the user population on the second side is in another country. Users on the first side 
are crucial for the platform company’s ability to profit from users on the second side, yet such 
“user value creation” in the country of the first side may be accompanied by little or no payment 
from that country. And insofar as traditional international income taxation locates the source of 
income (and thereby any economic rent) mainly by tracking sources of payment (along with the 
location of physical activity), many economic rents will fail to be attributed to their proper 
origins.  
In fact, allocation criteria based on sources of factor payment and physical activities may 
fail to track LSR not just in the cases of businesses founded upon indirect network effects. Even 
among digital platforms, direct network effects, personalization, and data exploitation can also 
generate misattributed LSR. It is arguable that the traditional international income tax framework 
generally ignores the issue of market structure and the location of economic rent arising from 
such structure. The single focus in international taxation on preventing mis-attribution through 
                                                          
10 See infra Part II.A.  
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transfer pricing among related parties has systematically come at the expense of neglecting rent 
attribution in the context of third-party transactions in markets characterized by imperfect 
competition.  
In addition to geographically allocating rent based on market structure, this article 
introduces an additional fundamental intuition about rent allocation. The recent literature on 
international taxation has increasingly referred to a distinction between mobile and immobile 
rent, yet the nature of this distinction is rarely a focus of discussion. Technology, intellectual 
property, and intangible assets are often presented as the source of mobile, firm-specific but not 
location-specific rent. In contrast, I argue that even when economic rent is earned from activities 
that are geographically highly mobile (e.g., servers supporting platform operations), some such 
rent can be viewed as location-specific or immobile. This happens when a technology can be 
deployed simultaneously in multiple locations. The fact that the deployment of a technology is 
non-rival—its deployment in one country has no opportunity cost in terms of its deployment in 
another country—implies that any rent earned from the technology’s deployment with respect to 
a given country can be attributed to that country. Therefore, the sources of purely mobile and 
non-location-specific rent may be fewer than previously recognized.  
Finally, in terms of the practical effects of unilateral implementations of the DST, the 
paper will advance the following observations. First, many digital platforms generate revenue at 
zero or negligible marginal cost. If—though this is unlikely to be the case—digital platforms’ 
production and pricing decisions are based on the relationship between marginal costs and 
demand, then a tax on revenue such as the DST may generate no distortion. If digital platforms’ 
marginal costs are not zero, and, more importantly, if they operate in environments characterized 
by imperfect competition, then the DST’s incidence is harder to predict. Second, many casual 
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claims that have been made about the DST’s undesirable incidence effects are incorrect. For 
example, if platforms pass the cost of the DST onto advertisers, this will reduce advertisers’ 
profit. But since advertising represents a fixed rather than marginal cost, it’s not at all clear why 
the DST on advertising would be passed onto final consumers. Third, to the extent that the DST 
allows the country imposing it to collect revenue on transactions between digital platforms and 
foreign producers and consumers, this may be viewed as a fair transfer from the surplus enjoyed 
by foreign producers or consumers to the country that is the origin of the surplus. Fourth, while 
the DST may also increase prices paid by domestic producers and consumers, income taxes may 
also have such effect. The country imposing the DST may well view such increases as a 
reasonable price to pay for capturing some of the rent earned by platform firms. Fifth, a great 
deal of the expenditures of digital platforms may be aimed at capturing market share. Such 
expenditures’ private value to the firm is greater than their social value, and a revenue tax may 
enhance social efficiency by deterring excessive entry and mitigating market fragmentation.     
This Article will focus on the most fundamental issues in motivating and designing the 
DST. There are numerous subsidiary issues, such as how countries need to coordinate in 
imposing the DST to avoid excessive taxation, the DST’s relation to tax treaties, the charge that 
introducing the DST inappropriately “ring-fences” the digital economy, etc. that I discuss in 
separate work.11    
The rest of the Article is organized as follows. Part I lays out certain policy details of the 
EC’s and UK’s DST proposals, both to give the reader a sense of the targeted nature of the DSTs 
that are likely to be implemented in the near future, and to distinguish the versions of the DST I 
                                                          
11 See Wei Cui, The Superiority of the Digital Services Tax over “Significant Digital Presence” Proposals, 
forthcoming in National Tax Journal (December 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3427313.  
7 
 
will be chiefly concerned with and some others, such as the Indian equalization levy, that aim to 
correct not the mis-attribution of rent but the absence of a PE. Part II then examines the 
fundamental rationales motivating the DST. It shows how platform rent can be viewed as 
location-specific in a wide range of settings, and emphasizes the distinction between the 
principles of taxing rent where it arises and of taxing MNC profit in the country of “destination.” 
Part III explains the fundamental ways in which traditional international income taxation misses 
rent allocation issues arising from market structure. It also highlights the normative underpinning 
of the new distinction this Article draws between mobile and immobile rent.  Part IV explains 
how to reason about the incidence effect of the DST and empirical evidence in support of such 
reasoning. A brief conclusion follows in Part V. 
 
I. EXAMPLES OF DST PROPOSALS 
This Part introduces some examples of proposed DSTs expected to be enacted in the near 
future. I first discuss the March 2018 DST Proposal from the European Council: although it is no 
longer actively discussed at the EC level, it represents the template for the DST enacted by 
France and proposed DST legislation pending enactment in Spain and Italy. I then summarize the 
UK’s 2018 DST proposal, both because the UK government championed the DST independently 
of the EC and offered its own extensive justifications for the tax, and because the UK proposal 
illustrates how some governments have deliberately narrowed the scope of the DSTs proposed. 
The limited scope of current DST proposals is an important feature of such proposals, but has 
received almost no discussion: governments, businesses, practitioners and academics that oppose 
the DST have been more interested in rejecting the tax categorically. In Part II, however, we will 
see that the rationales for imposing the DST apply to a much wider range of business models. 
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Another important preliminary issue is a distinction between the DSTs proposed by the 
EC and the UK, on one hand, and certain other (actual or proposed) taxes on digital platforms on 
the other. The critical difference for our purposes is whether the country imposing the DST is the 
source of payments to the platform company. A tax imposed on advertising revenue based on 
where the targeted audience is located, for example, is different from a tax on advertising based 
on where the purchaser of advertising services is located. The EC/UK DSTs present examples of 
the former: they would subject platform advertising revenue to tax as long as the advertising is 
targeted at European/UK consumers, even if producers outside Europe/UK pay for the 
advertisements. The Indian Equalization Levy, by contrast, is imposed on payments from India 
for advertising services. This Part explains the significance of this distinction.  
  
A. The EC DST Proposal 
The March 2018 EC DST Proposal contains specific language for a directive to be 
adopted by the EC, in addition to an explanatory memorandum as well as extensive recitals that 
elaborate the policy objectives of the proposed directive.12 For our purposes, the most important 
aspects of the proposed directive are the provisions on taxable revenue, and on how taxable 
revenue is to be allocated among EU member states.13  
 
1. Taxable Revenue  
                                                          
12 EC DST Proposal, supra note 1.  
13 The proposed directive also contains extensive provisions regarding the DST’s administrative aspects: 
see id. at Articles 9-23.  
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“Taxable revenue” in the EC DST Proposal consists of revenues from three types of 
services:  
(a) the placing on a digital interface of advertising targeted at users of that interface; 
(b) the making available to users of a multi-sided digital interface which allows users to find 
other users and to interact with them, and which may also facilitate the provision of 
underlying supplies of goods or services directly between users; and 
(c) the transmission of data collected about users and generated from users' activities on 
digital interfaces. 14 
 
A number of carve-outs are made from these provisions, the most important of which are 
for service type (b): such services do not include “the making available of a digital interface 
where the sole or main purpose of making the interface available is for the entity making it 
available to supply digital content to users or to supply communication services to users or to 
supply payment services to users.”15   
The interpretation of these provisions depends on the definitions of several key terms. 
First, “digital interface” is defined broadly to mean “any software, including a website or a part 
thereof and applications, including mobile applications, accessible by users.”16 Second, “user” 
“means any individual or business”. These two definitions together render the scope of business 
revenue covered by the DST very broad. They also affect the ways in which the ensuing DST 
                                                          
14 Id. at Article 3(1).  
15 Id. at Article 3(4). Further exemptions from type (b) services are made for trading venues, “systematic 
internalizers”, and crowdfunding providers regulated by a 2014 European Directive (2014/65/EU) on 
financial instruments, and for facilitators of the grant of loans.  
16 Id. at Article 2(3). 
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revenue would be allocated among EU countries. A third definition, of “digital content,” 
counteracts the effects of the previous two definitions. “Digital content” comprises “data 
supplied in digital form, such as computer programmes, applications, music, videos, texts, games 
and any other software, other than the data represented by a digital interface.”17 Since revenue 
from the provision of digital content is exempted from the scope of the DST, an expansive 
reading of this term shrinks the scope of the DST.  
 With these definitions, the broad intent behind the EC’s delineation of taxable revenue 
seems discernible, even though much ambiguity remains. Type (a) services, for example, broadly 
capture online advertising. Type (b) services seem to encompass a whole range of digital 
business models selling connections among different users, such as Uber, AirBnB, Amazon 
Marketplace, Match/Tinder, the various platforms within the Booking Holdings group,18 and so 
on. At the same time, credit card companies and payment settlement services such as PayPal 
appear to be excluded from the DST.19  Equally importantly, online retailers (e.g., Amazon) and 
content and solution providers (e.g., Netflix, Spotify, Ubisoft, AWS, ADP) also appear to be 
excluded. The rationale offered by the EC for this is that although online retail, digital content 
provision, and online services might also allow some degree of user interaction, such interaction 
is ancillary to the main purpose of the delivery of goods, content, and services.20 The "value 
                                                          
17 Id. at Article 2(5). 
18 Booking.com’s owner, Booking Holdings, also owns familiar platforms such as OpenTable, Kayak, 
Priceline, Agoda, and RentalCars. 
19 However, payment services are not included in the exemptions from type (c) services. This would seem 
to leave them taxable as if such services involve “transmission of data collected about users and generated 
from users’ activities on digital interfaces”. 
20 EC DST Proposal, note 1, at 8. 
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creation” in such cases lies mainly with the production of the goods, content, and services sold 
online, whereas the user’s role in value creation is, supposedly, less central.21  
 
 The precise application of the proposed directive’s language is far from clear, even in 
some seemingly central cases of digital platforms. Is Microsoft, the provider of operating 
systems (clearly a software accessible by users), a business that makes available a digital 
interface that facilitates the supply of goods or services directly between users (e.g., between end 
users and app developers), or is it a provider of digital content? If LinkedIn provides information 
about other LinkedIn users in exchange for subscription fees, is this the provision of digital 
content, user intermediation, or the transmission of data? The proposed directive’s language 
leaves very large room for further determination on a case-by-case basis.  So far, commentaries 
on the proposed directive also mainly focus on its broad policy appeal (or lack thereof), instead 
of the precise delineation of its scope. 
 
2. Attribution of Revenue to EU Member States 
Taxable revenue will generate DST liability under the proposed directive—through a EU-
wide, uniform 3% tax rate22—only when earned by “taxable persons,” which are firms or 
corporate groups that earn (on a consolidated basis) worldwide revenue in excess of €750 million 
                                                          
21 Id. at recital paragraphs (13)-(15). Since many digital platforms engage both in online retail and content 
and service provision, on the one hand, and user intermediation, on the other, the EC DST Proposal 
appears to require them to separate revenue from taxable and non-taxable services: see Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, Tax Reform in the Digital Economy: Recent OECD and Commission Activity 
(Mar. 21, 2018), 
http://knowledge.freshfields.com/CN/Global/r/3734/tax_reform_in_the_digital_economy__recent_oecd_a
nd 
22 EC DST Proposal, note 1, at Article 8.  
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and taxable revenue “obtained . . . within the Union” in excess of €50 million in a financial year. 
Both for determining whether this basic threshold of taxability is met, and for understanding 
which countries can claim taxing rights and DST revenue, the proposed directive provides that 
revenue is “treated . . . as obtained in a Member State in [a] tax period if users with respect to the 
taxable service are located in that Member State in that tax period.”23 
Different rules for determining user location are in turn offered for different types of 
services.24 In the case of advertising revenue, it is clear that what matters is the location of the 
users towards which advertisements are targeted, not the locations of advertisement purchasers.25 
Similarly, in the case of data transmission, what matters is the location of the users the data 
regarding whom is transmitted.26 In the case of digital intermediation, however, since there are 
“users” on both sides of a platform, the determination of the source of revenue is less clear. It is 
apparently either (i) the location of a device that is used to conclude an underlying transaction on 
the interface, or, (ii) in cases other than the supplies of goods or services directly between users, 
the location of the device where the user accesses the account. Presumably, it takes two sides to 
“conclude” a transaction. Thus, it appears that revenue from digital intermediation can be 
attributed to different jurisdictions even in connection with the same transaction. 
These rules have provoked extensive discussion about the implementability of user 
geolocation and its compatibility with user privacy law.27 For purposes of this paper, however, 
                                                          
23 Id. at Article 5(1). 
24 Id. at Article 5(2).  
25 Specifically, the location where a device (on which the advertising in question appears) is used to 
access a digital interface.  
26 Specifically, the location where the user’s use of a device generated the data. 
27 Clifford Chance LLP, supra note ; Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Digital Economy Taxation: OECD 
Publishes Report on Taxation of the Digital Economy; European Commission Publishes Draft Directives, 
S&C MEMOS (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.sullcrom.com/digital-economy-taxation-oecd-publishes-
report-on-taxation-of-the-digital-economyeuropean-commission-publishes-draft-directives.  
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the more important issue is how user location determines the allocation of tax revenue, because it 
goes to the nature of the justification for imposing the DST in the first place. This aspect of the 
proposed directive has hardly received any commentary, yet important questions remain 
unanswered. For example, even if the location of viewers of advertisements can be determined, 
there is a question about whether allocation should be made on a per entity or per ad basis. Even 
for the same digital platform, some ads may be sold on a pay-per-view basis while others on a 
pay-per-click basis.28 Different advertising slots also attract different prices based on auctions. 
Therefore, it seems that apportionment should be made on a per advertisement basis.29 Similarly, 
with data transmission, it may be that data about different users may generate different quantities 
of revenues, and inaccuracies may arise if user numbers are deployed to apportion total revenue 
from data transmission.30  
Perhaps most importantly, the proposed directive allocates revenue from digital 
intermediation without distinguishing between types of users: “if the service involves a multi-
sided digital interface that facilitates the provision of underlying supplies of goods or services 
directly between users,” allocation is “in proportion to the number of users having concluded 
underlying transactions on the digital interface in that tax period.”31 Consequently, if there are 
                                                          
28 PricewaterhouseCoopers International, European Commission Proposals for Directives regarding fair 
taxation of the digital economy (“Digital Tax Package”) (May 16, 2018)   
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/about/assets/reponse-ec-proposals-digital-tax-package.pdf.  
29 See Martti Nieminen, The Scope of the Commission’s Digital Tax Proposals, 72 BUL. FOR ITNL. TAX. 
11 (2018): the author suggests that for targeted advertising, the apportionment would be done on a per 
advertisement basis. The more times an advertisement has been displayed through a device in a 
jurisdiction, the more DST it can claim. The number of users in a jurisdiction does not matter. 
30 Id. Nieminen suggests that for selling of user data, intermediation with underlying transactions, or 
intermediation without underlying transactions, the apportionment would be done on a per user basis. The 
more users there are in a jurisdiction, the more DST it can claim. The amount of data the users contribute 
or the magnitude of the transactions facilitated does not matter. 
31 EC DST Proposal,note 1, at 21: “Taxing rights over the revenues of the business making available the 
interface are allocated to Member States where the users concluding underlying transactions are located, 
irrespective of whether the users are the sellers of the underlying goods or services or the buyers.” 
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always more user-buyers than user-sellers, revenue from intermediation would always be 
allocated to a greater extent to the buyer jurisdiction. As we will see in Part II, this can be the 
wrong result, even from a user-value-creation perspective, if it is the seller-users that contribute 
the most value (as in the case of AirBnB).  
 
B. The UK DST Proposal 
 The UK government was an early advocate of the DST. In a position paper released in 
November 2017, HM Treasury announced its intention, “[p]ending reform of the international 
framework, .  . . [to] explore interim options to raise revenue from digital businesses that 
generate value from UK users, such as a tax on revenues that these businesses derive from the 
UK market.”32 Specifically, the scope of the tax would focus on revenue earned from 
intermediation and online advertising. Like the EC, the UK envisioned from the beginning that 
the DST would leave online retail and online content and service provision outside of its scope.33 
Unlike the EC, however, the UK never proposed that the sale or transmission of data per se 
would fall within the scope of the “interim” tax. 
In an updated position paper released in March 2018, HM Treasury further elaborated on 
which business models, in its opinion, rely significantly for their value on user participation. In 
particular, “user generated content,” “deep engagement,” and “contribution to brand” were 
identified as the most important forms of user value generation, in addition to network effects 
and externalities.34 On the basis of these factors, it was concluded that social networks, search 
                                                          
32 UK 2017 Paper, supra note 1, at paragraph 1.6. 
33 Id. at paragraph 4.10. 
34 UK 2018 Paper, supra note 1, at Chapter 2. 
15 
 
engines, and intermediation platforms raise more serious problems of misalignment between 
value creation and taxation than online content providers, e-retailers, and digital service 
providers do.35 HM Treasury’s emphasis that “user value creation” can be conceptualized 
independently of network effects and externalities is somewhat unique among governments 
offering policy justifications for the DST.   
In November 2018, HM Treasury and HM Revenue and Customs finally issued a 
consultation paper on the UK’s proposed DST in preparation for enabling legislation in 2019.36 
According to the document, the UK DST will be designed as a 2% tax on the UK revenues of 
digital businesses “that are considered to derive significant value from the participation of their 
users.”37 Specifically, these include “a social media platform, search engine or online 
marketplace.” In a significant deviation from the EC’s proposed DST, advertising revenue, 
unless it is earned by businesses otherwise “in scope,” would not be subject to the DST. 
However, all third-party revenue from “in-scope” businesses and linked to the participation of 
UK users would be subject to the tax, whether from advertising, subscription, sales of data, 
commissions or otherwise. 
Much of the boundary of “in scope” business activities awaits further determination.38 In 
terms of attribution of revenue to UK users, the proposal explains that for advertising revenue, 
UK revenue will be defined as “revenue from adverts displayed at UK users,” while for revenue 
                                                          
35 Id. at paragraphs 2.42-2.48.  
36 UK DST: Consultation, supra note 1. The tax would apply from April 2020. According to a recent 
update, “HMT expects to have final legislation drawn by July 2019, which would then be included in the 
2019-20 Finance Bill to be voted on in the fall of 2019”  
37 Id. at 4. 
38 While the EC DST proposal seems to intend to rely on the notion of “digital content” to exclude 
businesses from the DST’s scope, the UK DST proposal may need to further clarify the meaning of 
“social media,” “search engine,” and “online marketplaces.” 
16 
 
derived from other forms (e.g., subscription, commission, etc.), “the question will be whether the 
payment comes from a UK user, or relates to a transaction that involves a UK user.”39 
 
The UK DST proposal includes several other notable features. The threshold of taxability 
is potentially higher than under the EC proposal: a business will only become taxable if it 
generates more than £500 million in global annual revenues specifically from “in-scope business 
activities,” as opposed to business revenue of any kind.40 Businesses will not have to pay tax on 
their first £25 million of UK taxable revenues. Taxpayers thus face a kink, not a notch, at the 
threshold. The tax will also include a “safe harbor” which will allow businesses with very low 
profit margins to elect to make an alternative calculation of their DST liability. 
Like the EC, the UK government gives great emphasis to the idea that the DST would be 
narrowly targeted. Such narrow targeting is taken to be necessary for the DST’s legitimacy: the 
tax supposedly is introduced only in sectors witnessing the largest discrepancies between user 
value creation and traditional profit attribution. In the next two Parts, we will examine the nature 
of such purported discrepancies. Two remarks, however, are worth making about the DST’s 
narrow scope at the outset. First, advertising and online marketplaces involve platform models 
that are oriented towards consumers. This orientation of the earliest DST proposals has led to a 
particularly easy conflation between countries hosting users “creating value” for platforms and 
countries hosting individual consumers (“destination” countries). We will see, however, that the 
fundamental rationales for a DST differ strongly from arguments that have been made in favor of 
destination-based allocation. 
                                                          
39 UK DST: Consultation, supra note 1, at 19. 
40 The business would also need to earn more than £25 million in annual revenues from in-scope business 
activities linked to the participation of UK users. 
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Second, because the incidence effect of the DST is complex, heterogeneous across 
different businesses, and not entirely predictable, it may be a good thing for any real-world DST 
to start with a relatively narrow scope: this would allow the DST’s impact to be better 
understood before countries expand its application. From this perspective, the initial scope of the 
DST need not be delineated to satisfy all normative considerations. However, after DSTs are 
enacted in real practice, the boundaries of DST exemptions may come to receive greater scrutiny. 
In other words, the legitimacy of DST proposals may depend on using some business models to 
motivate the introduction of a new tax while, simultaneously, not drawing too sharp a distinction 
between these business models and others currently not within the scope of the DST. 
 
C. Digital Taxes Linked to Lack of Business Presence 
Both those alarmed by, and those in favor of, DST proposals have had reason to 
emphasize how many countries around the world are poised to take unilateral action against “Big 
Tech”. In support of this claim, they have stressed commonalities and downplayed differences 
among new “digital taxes.” A useful distinction, however, can be made between (i) those digital 
taxes imposed only on payments made from the tax-imposing jurisdiction, and (ii) those that 
base taxing rights on “users” regardless of whether the users make payments.  The Indian 
Equalization Levy (EL) introduced in 2016 illustrates a type (i) tax.41 The EL is a 6% charge 
deducted from the gross amount a business located in India pays to a non-resident enterprise for 
the provision of online advertisement services. Thus, if an Indian manufacturer purchases 
advertisement space on Google targeted towards customers in Sri Lanka, the EL would apply, 
                                                          
41 OECD 2018 Report, supra note 5, at 142. 
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but if a Sri Lankan producer purchases advertisement space on Google targeted towards 
customers in India, the EL would not. Italy’s proposed Levy on Digital Transactions appears to 
have a similar structure.42 The EC and UK proposed DSTs, however, are taxes of type (ii).43  
The reason to distinguish between type (i) and type (ii) taxes is that certain justifications 
commonly offered for the former can be irrelevant for the latter. To justify type (i) taxes, 
countries often point to the shift of MNCs from “brick and mortar” models of doing business to 
engaging in service provision and management remotely. Such a shift makes it harder for 
countries to tax MNCs on the basis of physical presence. More technically, the business profit 
that MNCs make from a country—as evidenced by the payments they receive from it—fail to be 
allocated to the country because of the absence of PEs. The absence of physical presence or PEs 
may result from “artificial” tax planning, in which case anti-avoidance legislation, such as 
diverted profit taxes,44 may be justified. Furthermore, even if there is no tax avoidance, taxing 
payments in the absence of physical presence may still be necessary to create an equal footing 
between multinational companies and domestic firms (hence the term “equalization” levy).  
A key argument for type (ii) taxes, by contrast, is that much of a platform’s rent 
attributable to a particular jurisdiction may not only fail to be embodied through physical activity 
but also fail to manifest in payment from that jurisdiction. From this perspective, recent claims 
that the failings of the traditional international tax regime are attributable mainly to its reliance 
on “brick and mortar” business models understate (or mis-represent) the tax policy challenges 
posed by digital platforms. The fundamental mis-alignment between “value creation” and 
                                                          
42 Id., at 143.  
43 Hungary’s tax on advertising also make the presence of targeted consumers in Hungary a crucial 
element in determining what revenue is taxable. See id. at 145 and 146. 
44 Philip Wagman, The U.K. Diverted Profits Tax: Selected U.S. Tax Considerations, 147 TAX NOTES 
1413 (JUNE 22, 2015).  
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traditional profit allocation approaches is not a matter of physical presence or absence. 
Moreover, insofar as arguments for type (ii) taxes rely on location-specific rent, some instances 
of type (i) taxes may be hard to justify.  For example, unless there are reasons to believe that 
purchasers of advertising generate rent for digital platforms that is specific to the country of the 
purchasers, a tax imposed by the country of advertisement purchasers cannot appeal to LSR. In 
fact, insofar as placing the ads of producers from one country reduces the scope for placing ads 
of producers from another country—for example because users are ad-averse and the placement 
of additional ads may have the effect of reducing users—any rent earned by a digital platform 
from local producers is arguably not “location specific.” Finally, the fundamental arguments in 
favor of type (ii) taxes are based on fair allocations of taxing rights. Advocates of such taxes may 
be less concerned with, and more agnostic about, the anti-competitive effects of the traditional 
international tax paradigm. 
 
II. LOCATION-SPECIFIC RENT ON PLATFORMS 
 The main argument this paper advances to support the DST identifies significant sources 
of location-specific rent (LSR), the taxing rights over which, under the traditional international 
tax regime, fail to be allocated to the jurisdiction where the rent arises. The argument has two 
inter-linked components. The first explains how digital platforms can generate “hidden” sources 
of LSR—rents that may be invisible from the perspective of traditional international taxation. 
That is the task of this Part. The second articulates how the goal of capturing platform LSR is ill-
served by traditional criteria for assigning taxing rights under the income tax (which criteria rely 
not only on physical presence but also on tracking streams of payment). That will be the task of 
the next Part. 
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A. Rent Arising from Multi-sided Business Models 
Debates about reforming international taxation are often filled with buzzwords. “Indirect 
network effects” and “multi-sided business models” may understandably strike some readers as 
merely the latest varieties of colorful specks in the word salads routinely on offer. However, 
these words actually denote genuinely important economic concepts essential for motivating the 
DST.  
Platform companies typically offer two different types of services to two different types 
of users.45 They do so because of externalities among these two types of users, which exist when 
one type of user (on one “side”) cares about attributes of the other type of user (on “the other 
side”), including how many such latter users there are. Such “indirect network effects” are 
crucial to the operation of two- or multi-sided businesses.46 In particular, the platform 
manipulates the structure of the prices charged to each side, because variations in such price 
structure (even when the aggregate price charged to the two sides for a given transaction is fixed) 
can lead to different volumes of transactions.47 A standard (though eminently outdated) example 
is heterosexual nightclubs, which may charge an entry fee to men but let women in for free.48 
                                                          
45 Many platform companies are multi-sided, serving and exploiting cross-side externalities among more 
than two types of users. See Marc Rysman, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 
125 (2009). The basic arguments advanced in this paper about two-sided platforms can easily be extended 
to multi-sided platforms. 
46 See Alexander White, Online Platforms, Economics of, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS (Online eds., 2012); Jonathan D. Levin, The Economics of Internet Markets, (NBER 
Working Paper No. 16852, Mar. 2011), https://www.nber.org/papers/w16852.  
47 Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report 37 RAND J. OF ECON. 645 
(2006); Lapo Filistrucchi, Damien Geradin & Eric van Damm, Identifying Two-Sided Markets, 36 
WORLD COMPETITION 33 (2013). 
48 Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael L. Katz, What’s So Special About Two-Sided Markets? In Martin 
Guzman (Ed.) Toward a Just Society: Joseph Stiglitz and Twenty-First Century Economics, Columbia 
University Press. (2018).  
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Suppose that charging men $10 for entry but women $0 can attract 50 men and 50 women, while 
charging $5 to everyone puts women off, and without women only 70 men show up. This “price 
structure” would not matter to a man and a woman who are an established couple, but because 
there are individuals who need the nightclub to access individuals of the other gender, and 
because of the differing preferences of men and women, the nightclub can generate more 
revenue by adopting the first price structure.  
As the nightclub example shows, “two-sided” business models are neither new, nor 
necessarily digital, and need least of all to be international. However, some of largest and most 
profitable MNCs in the world now run such business models.49 Consider Facebook and Google, 
whose fabulous profitability explains why advertising revenue is a central focus of current DST 
proposals. They offer clear illustrations of the operation of a two-sided platform: individual users 
benefit from Facebook’s social media and Google’s search services typically without paying any 
monetary price, while the companies charge advertisers on the other side. Although the extent of 
the effectiveness of online advertising is still unclear,50 apparently advertisers find it a more 
effective means—or at least offering a much larger margin for investing in advertising without 
diminishing returns—than existing alternatives. Most other recent “tech titans” are also digital 
platforms: Apple, Amazon, Uber, Netflix—the list goes on.  
                                                          
49 David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Business, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (Roger Blair & Daniel Sokol eds., 
2015); Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, What’s So Special About Two-Sided Markets? in 
TOWARD A JUST SOCIETY: JOSEPH STIGLITZ AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ECONOMICS 111 (Martin 
Guzman, ed., 2018); Michael Katz & Jonathan Sallet, Multisided Platforms and Antitrust Enforcement 
127 YALE L, J. 2142 (2018). 
50 Jasmine Gasrd, Does Facebook Really Work? People Question the Effectiveness of Ads, NPR (Sept. 12, 
2018), available at: https://www.npr.org/2018/09/12/647040758/advertising-on-facebook-is-it-worth-it; 
Anja Lambrecht et al., How do Firms Make Money Selling Digital Goods Online?, 25 MARK. LETT. 331 
(2014).  
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A basic insight from the economic analysis of multi-sided business models is that a two-
sided business can price below marginal cost on one side (i.e., providing a subsidy to that side) 
while making up for that loss on the other side. This fundamental insight has a direct and obvious 
relevance for international taxation. A two-sided platform may provide services at prices below 
cost (including at negative prices or entirely for free) to users (e.g., individual consumers) on one 
side in a given country, while charging users (e.g., sellers of products and services) on another 
side in a different country for access to the first set of users. Users on the first side are crucial for 
the platform company’s ability to profit from users on the second side, yet such “user value 
creation” in the country of the first side may be accompanied by little or no payment from that 
country.51  
To fully understand how multi-sided platforms generate LSR, we can start with the 
examples of online advertising and online marketplaces.  
 
1. Advertising and Online Marketplaces 
Consider a German car manufacturer wishing to sell more cars to UK consumers. It 
purchases advertising space on Google to specifically target UK individuals. Several things can 
be said about this transaction. First, in all likelihood, the German car manufacturer is paying 
Google out of expected profit from sales to UK consumers. Second, the possibility of such profit 
arises from potential increases in the demand for the particular type of German car being 
                                                          
51 Indeed, the subsidized users (e.g., through the non-charging or waiver of subscription or transaction 
fees) effectively receive in-kind income. What justification can a country have for taxing a foreign 
company when it is one’s own residents that earn income? This was a question frequently used to dismiss 
DST proposals early in 2018. See Wolfgang Schön, Ten Questions about Why and How to Tax the 
Digitalized Economy, 72 IBFD BULL. FOR INT’L TAX. (2018); Johannes Becker & Joachim Englisch, EU 
Digital Services Tax: A Populist and Flawed Proposal, KLUWER INT’L TAX BLOG (Mar. 16, 2018), 
http://kluwertaxblog.com/2018/03/16/eu-digital-services-tax-populist-flawed-propos al/. 
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advertised. It does not arise from the way in which the German cars are produced—the 
advertisement does not change the German company’s marginal cost of car production. Instead, 
the German company’s production function and (short-term) supply curve remain the same. The 
point of the advertisement is to shift UK consumers’ demand curve for the German car outwards. 
Third, if we ask, “What accounts for the potential/expected outward shift of the UK consumers’ 
demand curve?” it seems that the change in demand entirely depends on the expected 
interactions between Google and UK users of the online search engine, something that happens 
outside of Germany. In short, Google’s advertising revenue comes from the expected producer 
surplus from the German car manufacturer, which in turn arises independently of anything 
occurring in Germany. 
This makes another question unavoidable: where do the interactions between Google and 
UK users take place? Google’s servers may be located in some third country (e.g., Ireland) or 
countries. Just as importantly, Google’s technology and business innovations originate largely 
from the United States. In what sense can Google’s profit from targeting advertisement at UK 
consumers be attributed to the UK, and not to Ireland, the United States, or elsewhere? To many 
commentators on international taxation, these questions do not afford conclusive or even 
logically coherent answers.  
There is one line of reasoning, however, suggesting that Google’s profit in the example 
above can be pinned down to the UK. Suppose (as is approximately the case in the real world) 
that Google’s technology, once developed, can be deployed simultaneously in different parts of 
the world. Nothing about the ads placed by the German manufacturers targeted at UK consumers 
prevents Google from placing ads targeted at users elsewhere, and vice versa. That is, decreasing 
UK-targeted ads does not lead to greater profit from ads targeted elsewhere, and increasing UK-
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targeted ads does not reduce profit from ads targeted elsewhere. It follows that the profit Google 
makes from placing ads targeted at UK consumers cannot be made elsewhere. Once the cost of 
any real resources Google deploys in placing the UK-targeted ads is subtracted, any residual 
profit—which, by definition, is free of opportunity cost and represents economic rent—is 
specific to the UK. Such profit exists by virtue of the involvement of UK consumers. 
Thus through a two-step process of reasoning—first allocating Google’s profit away from 
Germany, then allocating it away from the countries of Google’s servers or R&D activities—one 
is led to the conclusion that Google’s profit from selling advertising to the German car 
manufacturer is more traceable to the UK than it is to Germany or some other country. In this 
sense, Google’s advertising revenue earned from the German car manufacturer generates LSR in 
the UK.   
Similar arguments can be made about a variety of online marketplaces. Take Amazon 
Marketplace, which generated 17% ($23 billion) of Amazon’s total net revenue in 2016. Buyers 
on Amazon Marketplace do not pay any fee. Only sellers pay commissions per transaction (plus 
subscription fees for professional sellers). For a large subpopulation of the third-party sellers, it 
is plausible to assume that their business activities are of substantially the same kind as they 
would be without participating in online sales (i.e., these sellers have the same production 
functions online and offline).52 What Amazon Marketplace offers is a substantial boost in 
demand from the indirect network effect online. Such effect is the joint product of buyer 
activities on Amazon and Amazon’s own technology and business model (with important 
spillovers between its different lines of business). Given that online sellers generally multi-home, 
                                                          
52 Think of the used bookstore that buys used books from locals and sell to buyers around the world 
online.  
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it is plausible to infer that Amazon’s ability to earn commission from online sellers is not 
attributable to anything happening in the sellers’ jurisdictions per se.53   
Of course, many things contribute to Amazon’s advantage over traditional retailers.54 
Attributing Amazon’s profit (before capital expenditures) to buyer locations may be more 
complex than in the case of online advertising. For example, if a proprietary logistic 
infrastructure is responsible for Amazon’s success in a jurisdiction (e.g., in Germany, but not in 
Austria), then some rent may be attributable to that jurisdiction, for reasons not directly related to 
“user value creation”. In addition, Amazon sometimes may need to create country- or language-
specific interfaces to operate (though it is not clear whether this in itself would generate any 
rent).55 However, it might be claimed Amazon’s technology and business innovations are 
preconditions for the emergence and magnitude of values created in interactions with users, and 
therefore any rent earned from such technology or innovation should be ascribed to the 
jurisdiction from which they issue (i.e., the United States). Countering this claim, we have seen 
that there is an alternative position: to the extent that Amazon uses a technology or some 
intangible asset that can be simultaneously deployed in different jurisdictions, such that its use 
                                                          
53 Indeed, most Amazon users’ experience is probably best described as purchasing from Amazon 
(including purchasing from Amazon “five-star sellers”), not from particular online sellers.  
54 These include, particularly, (i) operating a proprietary logistic infrastructure and adopting 
correspondingly a unique style of supply chain management, (ii) operating simultaneously as a 
marketplace and online retailor, (iii) superior web design and technological innovation, and (iv) running a 
multisided business model (including e.g. a giant computing division, publishing, and online 
entertainment). See Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox 126 YALE LAW JOURNAL 710 (2017). 
55 Both the creation of the interface and its maintenance may take place outside the country at which it is 
targeted. Professor Schön suggests that a reasonable return to the cost of such country-specific “digital 
investment” can be attributed to the targeted country: Schön, supra note 51. If such “reasonable return” 
corresponds to what has come to be called “routine returns” to investment, then Professor Schön’s 
suggestion (i) does not apply to the allocation of economic rent, and (ii) creates a conflict for the 
allocation of routine returns to labor/capital—the standard suggestion being to allocate routine returns to 
where labor/capital are physically located.   
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with respect to buyers in one country does not affect its use with respect to buyers in another, it 
is possible to attribute the rent earned by that technology to the user location.   
We will return to the examples of online advertising and online marketplaces in Part IV, 
when discussing the DST’s potential incidence effects. The key observation regarding these 
examples so far is that a two-sided business (e.g., Facebook, Google, or Amazon Marketplace) 
can earn a profit from payments received from one side while the origin of the profit can 
plausibly be traced exclusively to the other side. This observation has profound implications for 
international taxation and offers the fundamental justification for the DST. Before exploring 
these implications, however, it is vital to note that the observation can hold not just when a 
platform earns a profit from sellers, but also when it earns a profit from consumers.   
 
2. Platform Rent from Producer Jurisdictions  
Many platforms selling connections between producers and buyers of goods and services 
subsidize the producer side. For example, the crucial business strategy for AirBnB is to get 
property owners to rent out rooms who would not do so otherwise. To bring landlords to market, 
AirBnB needs to subsidize them in various ways—e.g., reducing initial listing fees, producing 
professional photography of the premises, etc.56 AirBnB earns a profit mainly from service fees 
charged to renters. The renters come from all over the world, and contribute to the profitability of 
AirBnB, but it is arguably the participation of the property owners that enable the success of 
AirBnB’s business.  
                                                          
56 Ben Edelman, The Market Design and Policy of Online Review Platforms, 33 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. 
POL. 635. A main threat to AirBnB’s profitability is other online booking websites (e.g., Booking.com) 
accessing the same landlords, i.e., enticing the latter to multi-home. See Harrison Jacobs, Airbnb is in a 
war with Booking.com, and taking advantage of that fact can save you a ton of money, BUSINESS INSIDER 
(Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/airbnb-bookingcom-save-money-travel-2018-8. 
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Thus it is possible to tell a story similar to the German carmaker purchasing advertising 
space on Google and Facebook, or the online seller paying a commission to Amazon, except 
with the seller and buyer’s roles reversed. It seems plausible to say that tourists’ preferences and 
demand are un-altered, or at least altered much less, by AirBnB. The possibility of transactions 
through AirBnB—and therefore of additional consumer surplus, from which AirBnB extracts the 
majority of its profits—results from a rightward shift of the supply curve of properties. Thus 
AirBnB’s profit can be viewed as location-specific, not merely because the properties listed have 
specific physical locations, and not even just because the consumption of the tourists occurs in 
the same locations, but because the interaction between AirBnB and landlords is what created the 
possibility of the transactions in the first place. Moreover, the deployment of AirBnB’s 
technology or business model is not sufficient in itself and requires the participation of property 
owners; and the deployment of AirBnB’s technology in one country seems not to interfere with 
such deployment elsewhere.  
Here again we observe a striking pattern. The platform (AirBnB) can earn a profit from 
payments received from the consumer side, while the origin of that very profit may have more to 
do with the other, supplier, side. Note that we are talking about the profit AirBnB earns from 
renters. AirBnB may also earn a profit from the fees it charges landlords (although that is 
unlikely). The landlords may also earn a profit from payments from tourists. These latter profits 
may, for independent reasons, be attributed to the landlord’s jurisdiction, and may already be 
subject to various taxes in that jurisdiction.57 None of them, however, should be confused with 
                                                          
57 The landlord presumably is subject to the property jurisdiction’s income, property and consumption 
taxes. AirBnB may not be subject to tax on payments from landlords under common income or 
consumption taxes in the absence of a permanent establishment, but could be so subject under non-
standard arrangements. 
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the profit AirBnB earns from charging tourists. It is this profit whose connection with the 
property jurisdiction would remain hidden, but for the type of profit-attribution reasoning 
articulated above.   
The AirBnB example illustrates an important point: “hidden” LSR earned by digital 
platforms do not arise only in consumer jurisdictions. Therefore “user value creation” on digital 
platforms should not be conflated with participation by consumers alone. Indeed, a large array of 
two-sided business models subsidize the producer and not the consumer side. For example, 
despite the plausibility of stories of Uber’s exploitation of drivers, it is generally thought that on 
ride-sharing platforms, drivers are subsidized (to bring them to market) and payments from 
consumers are the source of platform profits. In gaming, gamers generate profit for the providers 
of consoles while game developers are subsidized. In operating systems, individual users of 
computers generate profit for the likes of Microsoft and Android while app developers are 
subsidized. In all these cases—and in contrast to the examples of Google, Facebook, and 
Amazon Marketplace—the hidden LSRs are on the producer’s side.   
This is the fundamental reason why, as Part III explains more fully, the new claims to 
taxation generated by two-sided platforms, arising from the divergence between the jurisdiction 
of LSR and the jurisdiction of payment/income recognition, do not necessarily allocate taxing 
rights from source or producer countries to destination or consumer countries. The DST’s aim is 
arguably to enable the taxation of LSR, which can arise either in a producer or a consumer 
jurisdiction.  Therefore, the DST should not be understood as purely “destination-based.”58  
                                                          
58 One might note that the conflation of “user value creation” with consumer involvement threatens to 
muddy ideas even among proponents of the DST. For example, the EC and the UK DST proposals all 
refrained from taxing gaming, on the ground that the main value creation in the business comes from the 
providers of content, not from the consumers of content. But this merely considers the taxation of gaming 
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Conversely, proposals for destination-based apportionment tend to consider location specific rent 
only on an ad hoc basis. Indeed, I will argue that from a normative perspective, the method of 
geographic allocation of rent proposed in this paper is much less arbitrary than uniform 
allocation to consumer jurisdictions.   
The AirBnB example also serves to show that not all “users” are of the same value in a 
platform business. For AirBnB the platform’s location specific rent is attributable to the 
jurisdiction where AirBnB hosts’ properties are located, but there are clearly a lot more renters 
than hosts among AirBnB “users.” If a tax on AirBnB’s profit (or revenue) is allocated to 
different countries according to how many “users” are located in each, the countries generating 
the LSR will hardly get to tax any of the platform’s profit. This is a potential critique of many 
current “user-based” proposals for allocating taxable revenue under the DST imposed on 
intermediation services.59 
 
B. Rent in One-sided Business Models 
While two-sided business models offer some of the most striking examples of hidden 
location-specific rent, they are not the only ones. Below we consider some additional examples. 
 
1. Direct Network Effects among Users 
                                                          
platforms from the side of the consumers. If one considered the tax policy issue from the side of the 
developers of games, however, a country in which such developers are located may take the view that 
platform rent arises where the game development happens, and this value is not completely reflected in 
the compensation the developers receive. Like AirBnB landlords, the developers capture only a small 
portion of the consumer surplus enabled by the gaming platform. Such surplus can be viewed as location 
specific to where the talents developing the games reside. 
59 Supra note 31.  
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“Direct network effects” refer to externalities among users of the same type.60 Examples 
are the activities of individual users of Facebook, LinkedIn, YouTube, and Amazon who share 
content on these platforms, and the positive effect such activities have on other users’ 
participation. Network effects may provide strong incentives to users to remain or join a 
platform, potentially creating incumbent advantages. A platform provider can then potentially 
exploit such effect to earn profits, even without operating a two- or multi-sided platform (which 
involves indirect network effects discussed above). One example is Amazon as an online retailer 
(as distinguished from Amazon Marketplace). Purchasers on Amazon offer (without 
compensation) user reviews. The quantity and quality of user reviewers affect the chances that 
future users will make purchases on Amazon.61 In theory, Amazon’s profitability, as a seller of 
goods or services, may be partially attributed to consumer reviewers, the network effect among 
whom provides Amazon with an advantage in marketing. In this sense, “user-created value” 
contributes to the profitability of Amazon.  
The reader will recall from Part I that current DST proposals in principle exempt the 
online provision of goods and services. Putting aside data transmission, advertising and 
intermediation both involve two-sided businesses. No business model involving only direct 
network effects falls within the DST’s scope. This can be interpreted as reflecting two related 
difficulties in identifying location-specific rent in one-sided business models. First, the 
contribution of user participation to platform profit may be uncertain.  In comparison to other 
aspects of Amazon’s business strategy, for example, the impact of user reviews on Amazon’s 
                                                          
60 Paul Klemperer, Network Goods (Theory), in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 
(Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2008). 
61 For empirical studies on the effect of user reviews on consumer and producer surplus, see Chunhua Wu 
et al., The Economic Value of Online Reviews, 34 MARK. SCI. 739 (2015); Alan T. Sorensen, Bestseller 
Lists and the Economics of Product Discovery, 9 ANNU. REV. ECON. 87 (2017).  
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profit may be relatively small. Second, one-sided business models by definition extract payments 
from users. In contrast to two-sided business models, it is generally hard to distinguish, in one-
sided models, the profit attributable to the products sold from the profit attributable to marketing, 
even if both elements are present. It might be argued that any market power a firm gains from 
direct network effects is no different from other ways a firm may reduce competition, e.g., 
through product differentiation.62   
However, the possibility that direct network effects’ contribution to platform profits can 
be measured should not be ruled out.63 In the case of such measurable rent, there is still an 
important sense in which our previous argument uncovers its hidden location. Direct network 
effects are the product of user participation enabled by platform technology. To conclude that 
such effects are attributable to the location of the users, it is still helpful to confirm whether the 
operation of the platform in one country interferes with its operation elsewhere. If the answer is 
no—if, that is, the platform technology’s deployment is non-rival and free from opportunity 
cost—then it is coherent to attribute the rent accruing to the technology to the country of the 
users. Differently put, it is coherent to insist that such rent is immobile rent.   
Finally, it is worth noting that the ultimate purpose of identifying LSR in our discussion 
is to tax such rent. Platform rent is a distinct tax base from the consumption purchases generating 
the rent. Thus, even if a platform’s online sales are already subject to general consumption 
                                                          
62 Product differentiation generally reduces competition and create opportunities for mark-up. 
Conceptually it is not possible to say whether product differentiation moves the demand curve or the 
supply curve. Christopher S. Yoo, Intellectual Property and the Economics of Product Differentiation, In 
1 Research Handbook on the Economics of Intellectual Property Law (Ben Depoorter & Peter Menell 
eds., Edward Elgar 2018). 
63 Suppose that user reviews in Chinese are shown to substantially increase the number of Chinese buyers 
making purchases from an online retailer: there may then be a case that the corresponding increase in the 
retailer’s profit should be attributed to the location of the community of Chinese users. 
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taxation (i.e., through a value added tax) in the country of the buyer, it makes sense to discuss 
whether an additional tax should be applied to the platform, on account of and in an attempt to 
capture LSR.64  
 
2. Personalization of Remote Services 
One can distinguish between two frequently mentioned features of digital platforms on 
the user side. The first is the network effect already discussed. The other is personalization: 
users’ activities on a platform may reveal a lot of personal characteristics—with geolocation 
being the most obvious example—which may help both the platform provider and third parties to 
find profitable transactions with users. Personalization itself increases demand: the revelation of 
personal information (e.g., geolocation), apart from network effects, may generate new profitable 
transactions.  
In justifying its DST proposal, the UK government has argued that information-
generating user activities that allow the personal customization of services give rise to a new 
form of user-created value, thereby justifying the user jurisdiction’s claim to taxing profits from 
the remote delivery of goods and services.65 There are two ways of interpreting this argument. 
First, one can understand the argument to be that, prior to the advent of the digital economy, 
distribution and marketing functions would have been carried out by dedicated subsidiaries or 
permanent establishments. Such a traditional business presence in the consumer country (e.g., an 
                                                          
64 A general consumption tax applies to all products and services provided by all sellers, regardless of 
what they earn in LSR. 
65 UK 2018 Paper, supra note 1, at paragraphs 2.12-2.15. Under the current international tax regime, such 
profits are taxed only in the producer jurisdiction. 
33 
 
Apple Store) can generate its own location-specific rent.66 In the future, however, more and more 
such functions might be implemented virtually, where consumer participation and the consequent 
revelation of personal information would enable personalization. Because remote personalization 
replaces dedicated sales or distribution subsidiaries (or PEs), the producer surplus that would 
have been attributable to a subsidiary (or PE) should continue to be attributed to the customer 
jurisdiction. 
Such an argument would be obviously and unacceptably weak. A new business model 
has replaced an old business model. It is simply bizarre to claim that countries remain entitled to 
impose a tax based on the old business model because the new model replaces it.67 A second, 
more plausible interpretation of the UK’s argument is as follows. A technology (the intellectual 
property ownership of which can be located anywhere in the world) is deployed in a consumer 
country to shift consumer demand there for various products. Such a shift occurs independently 
of any changes in producers’ supply curves. It leads to additional transactions and thus increased 
consumer and producer surplus, a portion of which the technology owner extracts.  The 
consumer country may claim a portion of that surplus extracted, on the ground that it can arise 
without changes to the behavior of producers and consumers elsewhere.  
 
C. Data as a Source of Rent 
It is clear how the monetization of user data might represent a form of LSR: after all, the 
data is about users in particular locations. However, it is unclear whether in the near future, the 
                                                          
66 See Joseph Bankman, Mitchell Kane & Alan O. Sykes, Collecting the Rent: The Global Battle to 
Capture MNE Profits, TAX L. R. (forthcoming). 
67 It is like arguing that before international transportation costs are lowered, most production serving the 
domestic market happened domestically; therefore, all foreign production serving the domestic market 
today should be taxed like domestic production.    
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sale of data (even if not further regulated) can be a sustainable source of profit for platform 
companies. One might take the view that the activities digital platforms currently make profit 
from do not require the most advanced uses of data. This is very clear in the case of advertising. 
The success of intermediation services—which reduce transaction costs among parties that 
already are close to transacting with one another—also may be more attributable to smart or 
lucky market design than to powerful uses of data. Moreover, there is the consideration that, of 
all the data that Google collects, Google is most likely to be able to make the most valuable use 
of it. A platform company that does not know what use to make of the data it collects (and must 
sell the data to third parties) seems unlikely to remain competitive and stay in business.  The 
most sophisticated exploration of data (e.g., using machine learning) will remain proprietary to 
the platforms themselves. Because of this, a tax on the pure sale of data might raise little revenue 
even in the long term.68  
The mining of data could well be the most important aspect of digital services in the 
future, but the business models of such future services may also well be different from the ones 
today. Posner and Weyl, for example, argue that data is nowadays free mostly because of the 
monopsony power of digital platforms.69 They suggest that social welfare can be improved if 
platform companies actually compensate users for the data they provide (especially if the users 
can play crucial roles in assisting the application of machine learning to the data). It is thus 
                                                          
68 This suggests that a DST imposed on the sale of data may serve purposes other than expropriating 
corporate rent. Maybe it would discourage data collection and sale. Implementing such an objective, 
however, may have unintended consequences: see Francis Bloch & Gabrielle Demange, Taxation and 
Privacy Protection on Internet Platforms, 20 J PUB. ECON. THEORY 52 (2018).  
69 Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Data as Labor, in RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING CAPITALISM AND 
DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY 205 (2018).; Imanol Arrieta-Ibarra et al., Should We Treat Data as 
Labor? Moving Beyond “Free”, 108 AM. ECON. ASS. PAPERS AND PRO. 38 (May 2018). 
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somewhat speculative to analyze how data generates platform rent aside from advertising, 
intermediation, and the online provisions of goods and services. Nonetheless, plenty of narratives 
have been offered as to how human data can feed into algorithms to generate labor-replacing 
technology.70 Human data is literally a kind of natural resource in such narratives, and it is easy 
to understand how the countries in which the human beings are located may want to capture 
some of the rent extracted from such resource.71 
 
D. Summary 
The overall claim of this Part is that digital platforms earn significant forms of LSR. 
Platform LSRs are often distinctive for two reasons. First, in multi-sided platforms, the location of 
rent may be systematically different from the source of payment. Second, much platform rent is 
associated with the mobile deployment of technology, but because the technology by its very 
nature supports non-rival uses, the rent it generates can be coherently regarded as immobile.72  
The remainder of the Article will argue that taxing platform LSR should be seen as the 
main motivation of the DST. So understood, DST proposals do not embrace allocation of taxing 
rights to either destination or source countries. Instead, the idea is to allow the country where the 
rent is located to tax the rent. This can be the destination country of final consumers—which we 
can imagine to be the case for Amazon Marketplace (though the reality may be more complex)—
or the source country of suppliers of goods and services—which we can imagine to be the case 
for AirBnB (though, again, the reality may be more complex). There may even be scenarios 
                                                          
70 See Kai-Fu Lee, The Real Threat of Artificial Intelligence, THE N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2017). 
71 See International Monetary Fund, Corporate Taxation in the Global Economy (2019). 
72 It is quite possible for these two features of platform rent to be found in rent earned by firms that are 
not digital platforms. There is no reason to limit the applicability of the rent-attribution logic advanced 
here to digital platforms. 
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where the LSR arises in a residence country. Take crowd-funding platforms, for example. 
Existing empirical research suggests that the cross-side externalities on such platforms are 
asymmetrical: funders care much more about the participation of entrepreneurs than the other 
way around.73 However, there are still important network effects on the funders’ side.74 It is thus 
logically conceivable that in some future crowd funding models, the platform rent is found 
primarily in the funders’ side—which would justify allocating taxing rights to the “resident” 
country, using the terminology of current international income taxation.   
The idea that LSR can arise in destination, source, or residence countries is key to 
untangling the extraordinary amounts of confusion, about the relationship between “user value 
creation” and income taxation, that one finds in recent discussions about the DST. In the next 
Part, we will see that traditional income taxation has paid little attention to LSR arising from 
market structure; nor is it clear that it can—or should—be reformed to take market structure into 
account.  
 
III. RENT ALLOCATION AND THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 
A. Profit Attribution under the Traditional Corporate Income Tax 
Governments around the world rely on a rich array of tax and non-tax instruments to raise 
revenue from the rent-rich sectors of their economies. In the natural resource realm, for example, 
governments can generate revenue through auctioning licenses for resource extraction, taking 
                                                          
73 Ferdinand Thies, Michael Wessel & Alexander Benlian, Network effects on crowdfunding platforms: 
Exploring the implications of relaxing input control, 28 INFO. SYSTMS. J. 1239 (2018). 
74 Paul Belleflamme, Thomas Lambert & Armin Schwienbacher, Network Effects in Crowdfunding 
(2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3259191. 
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public ownership in resource extraction enterprises, enacting gross-revenue-based royalty 
regimes, levying sector-specific rent taxes on extraordinary, “excessive-” or “super-” profits, or 
imposing export tariffs, among other means.  Recently, Professors Bankman, Kane and Sykes 
have argued that if governments were interested in “collecting the rent” arising from the 
consumer base in their countries, they could modify the corporate income tax, or adopt suitable 
procurement policy, impose import tariffs, fashion particular anti-trust policy, among other tax 
and non-tax legal options. That income taxation is only one of the many policy instruments that 
governments have at their disposal to claim the public share of LSR corresponds to another 
important feature of rent taxation: when above-normal profits are earned, governments can 
impose higher rates of taxation without distorting business decisions. Taxing rent is in many 
ways just a rather different enterprise from taxing income or consumption generally.  
The relationship between the corporate income tax and the goal of taxing LSR is an 
uneasy one. Many economists recognize taxing foreign shareholders on rent earned by domestic 
corporations (on domestically-located activities) as one of the main arguments for keeping the 
source-based corporate income tax.75  Yet while some advocate reforming business income 
taxation to tax only LSR,76 others advocate reform options that completely abdicate that goal.77 
This suggests that transferring rent from private profits to the public fisc of the country in which 
the rent arises may merely be a (frequent) side effect of the corporate income tax, but not its 
goal.   
                                                          
75 Alan J. Auerbach, Michael P. Devereux & Helen Simpson, Taxing Corporate Income, in DIMENSIONS 
OF TAX DESIGN: THE MIRRLEES REVIEW 837, 870-71 (Adam Stuart et al. eds. 2010).   
76 See Robin Broadway& Jean-François Tremblay, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS 
FOR CANADA (2014). 
77 Alan J. Auerbach, Michael P. Devereux, Michael Keen & John Vella, Destination-Based Cash Flow 
Taxation (Oxford Univ. Ctr. for Bus. Tax., Working Paper No. 17/01, 2017), 
https://eml.berkeley.edu/~auerbach/CBTWP1701.pdf.  
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 To more clearly see the tenuous relationship between the corporate income tax, on the 
one hand, and the allocation of taxing rights according to rent location, on the other, it is useful 
to look directly at the general structure of the international allocation of taxing rights under the 
traditional income tax. Countries typically have the right to tax the income of their “residents,” 
including corporations. For non-residents, “income” is roughly divided between “business 
profits” and other types of income. A country generally gets to tax a non-resident on the latter’s 
business profits if such profits are attributable to a PE. Indeed, profit attribution to a PE, along 
with the allocation of profits among related enterprises, are the two main ways in which profits 
are assigned to different locations. For other types of income, income attribution is largely an 
exercise in tracking the source of payment.78   
 The attribution of business profits to a PE, however, is at its heart a highly indeterminate 
exercise, for two reasons. There are generally two policy motivations for finding that a non-
resident has a PE in a given country. The first is that the non-resident has enough of a physical 
presence to fulfill tax compliance obligations and to be administrable. That is, a PE is purely an 
administrative or compliance threshold. This means that the existence of a PE in a country may 
say nothing about how much profit is earned in that country: an obligation to calculate profit and 
the calculation of that profit are simply completely different things. A second reason to find the 
existence of a PE is based on a judgement that sufficient local physical activity generating local 
profit has transpired: that is, an implicit judgement is made that some (not insignificant) amount 
of profit is attributable to a country, and a more precise calculation is warranted. However, the 
                                                          
78 There are of course exceptions: for rent and royalties, the place where the tangible or intangible asset is 
used for business pursuits may be relevant; for interest, the place where borrowed funds are used and 
where interest expenses are claimed may be relevant; for dividends, the place where corporate profits are 
earned may be relevant; and so on. These are clearly derivative on the attribution of business profit by 
residence, PE, or among related parties.   
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principles generally guiding the explicit attribution of business profit to a PE (under Article 7 of 
tax treaties) do not shed much light on the intuitions behind the initial, crucial, but implicit 
judgment about profit attribution (under Article 5).    
 Therefore, the traditional approach to the ascription of profit to geographical locations is 
heavily dependent on the set of implicit intuitions about the significance physical presence in the 
PE concept. Many of these intuitions now seems outdated. For example, the idea that the storage 
and delivery of goods constitute mere preparatory or auxiliary business activities now seem 
laughable in light of Amazon’s business model. The idea that advertising, promotion, and 
gathering market information are similarly insignificant contributors to business profits has also 
been proven wrong. But just as importantly, because the PE concept always had an 
administrative component—it was more about deciding whether an obligation to calculate local 
business profit should be imposed than about the determination of how much profit there is—it 
was always, arguably, a weak guide to profit attribution.   
Of course, many specific contextual rules and conventions no doubt helped to make profit 
attribution more determinate, e.g. management accounting within different units of a single 
corporation or corporate group, legislative rules on the apportionment of interest expenses, 
profit-split methods under transfer pricing, etc.. But such rules and conventions tend either to 
have meaning mainly in the related party context, or are otherwise quite removed from concerns 
of identifying LSR.   
 
B. The Arm’s Length Principle versus Market Structure 
Simple reflection suggests that transfer pricing methodology should be entirely 
uninformative about platform rent location. Transfer pricing issues arise when the pricing of 
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transactions among related parties does not matter to the overall profit of the multi-national 
corporation group. Pricing decisions on different sides of a digital platform, however, are central 
to the platform’s profit maximization strategy.  
Consider the arm’s length principle (ALP). Once rent is earned from a digital platform, it 
may be shuffled among different entities in an MNC group, and the ALP may be useful for 
preventing this traditional type of profit shifting. But the inquiry into user value creation is 
primarily one about who, among parties already at arm’s length (e.g., the platform and the 
different sides it intermediates), is responsible for corporate rent earned. It would be very odd to 
be told that the answer to this question is: “We will first pretend that the third-party users are not 
third parties but a part of the digital platform’s business operations (e.g., a ‘significant digital 
presence’ carrying out ‘significant economic activities’). We will then attribute profits to this 
fictional business unit by further pretending that it is dealing with the platform company at arm’s 
length.” The application of the ALP in the context of Article 7 is already devoid of meaning in 
many contexts (such as a PE) where there is no related party transaction to begin with (and the 
threat from mis-pricing such transactions to correct profit attribution is itself fictional). It seems 
that its application to two-sided business models would generate only gibberish.   
It does not help that many of the rules used in traditional transfer pricing may also run 
counter to intuitions about locating platform rent. One such intuition articulated in Part II is that 
once a platform technology is applied to Country X to generate profit, assuming that the 
deployment of that technology for Country X users does not exclude the deployment of the same 
technology elsewhere, the entire economic rent generated by the technology in respect of 
Country X should be attributed to Country X. It is likely that current transfer pricing doctrines 
would resist this type of profit attribution, and insist that managerial decisions, legal ownership 
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of intellectual property rights, and the bearing of financial risks should entitle a company to 
residual (and extraordinary) profits outside the user jurisdiction. A strong case can be made that 
such disagreement about the fundamental principles of profit allocation should be discussed 
explicitly and separately at the outset, before agreeing that reforming the income tax is the best 
or only way in which concerns about the mis-attribution of LSR should be addressed. 
Overall, the most general devices for the geographical attribution of profits under 
international income taxation include corporate residence, the ALP when allocation among 
related entities are concerned, the intuitions and implicit judgments under Article 5, and 
considerations of sources of payments. It seems clear that none of these devices reflects the type 
of reasoning regarding how to locate platform rent considered in the last Part. Each of these 
devices is likely to generate mis-attributions in light of that reasoning.79 Strictly speaking, this 
can be viewed as a critique of the traditional international tax regime only if we assume that the 
corporate income tax should enable countries to capture the economic rents arising from them. 
That assumption itself, however, should not be accepted without questioning. As remarked on at 
the beginning of this Part, there is little evidence that governments restrict themselves generally 
to the corporate income tax for claiming a public share of LSR. 
 
C. The Normative Underpinnings of Profit Attribution 
                                                          
79 The examples relating to indirect network effects showed that source of payment are often poor 
indicators of the location of platform rent. The intuition about immobile rent from the deployment of 
technology is frequently in conflict attributing profit to the corporate owners of intangible assets.  
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The (exclusive) attribution of platform rent to locations is motivated by both efficiency 
and fairness considerations. It is important to make these considerations more explicit than we 
have so far.  
Some of the efficiency criteria for assessing the identification of LSR and the use of LSR 
so-identified to assign taxing rights are familiar.80 A tax on true economic rent is non-
distortionary with respect to both short-term production decisions and long-term investment 
decisions. The correct measurement of true economic rent earned by platform firms as opposed 
to quasi-rent is thus an important policy consideration. The association of (correctly measured) 
rent with particular locations raises a different efficiency concern: the assignment of location 
should not be easily manipulable. The examples offered in Part II suggest that this criterion may 
be satisfied by the rent attribution reasoning proposed there. Platform users are generally 
unrelated to the platforms and network effects importantly depend on user size. There should be 
a strong presumption, therefore, that platforms take their users’ locations as given. This seems to 
hold true not only for users that are individual consumers, but also for landlords, drivers, online 
sellers, game or app developers, and all of the other users that platforms try to subsidize and 
bring to market. 
But efficiency is far from the only attraction of the approach to allocating platform rent 
outlined in Part II.81 Indeed, it is hard to see how any argument about the ways business profits 
should be allocated among nations for tax purposes can avoid addressing questions about 
fairness. Each step in the two-step approach of identifying the location of platform rent discussed 
                                                          
80 In Part IV we will see that some less familiar efficiency considerations may also possess high 
importance for designing taxes for platforms. For example, the DST may serve as a corrective tax that 
deters excessive entry into markets that have natural monopoly features.  
81 That the assignment of taxing right over LSR is not just a matter of economic efficiency is emphasized 
in Mitchell Kane, A Defense of Source Rules in International Taxation, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 311 (2015). 
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in Part II makes implicit fairness claims. In the cases of cross-side externalities, the perspective 
from fairness is that it is fair and equitable for the country that generated additional consumer or 
producer surplus (as the case may be) in another country to claim a portion of such surplus that is 
paid over to the platform. In the case of attributing rent from the non-rival use of technologies 
(even if invented elsewhere), the perspective from fairness is that the inventors of technology, as 
valuable and unique as their talent and entrepreneurial spirit may be, should not expect to keep 
the entire residual profit from their invention, and nor should their countries of residence.   
A sure sign of fairness claims is that they invite moral debate and deliberation. Suppose 
that American companies dominate the world in inventing powerful technologies accessed by 
users in all countries in the world, and that they earn monopoly profits in business models that 
depend on the participation of the users. Although the United States is the country in which the 
technologies are invented, by the profit-attribution reasoning described in Part II, only the profit 
derived from American users are attributable to the United States. In the context of taxation, this 
means that the United States need not be the primary claimant to the profits that result from the 
technologies its companies invent. As long as the use of the technologies is non-rival, the 
countries in which the users are located may turn out to be primary claimants instead. It would of 
course not be surprising if some Americans find such a claim provocative. It would be surprising, 
however, if no American can recognize that the claim is intelligible and prima facie eligible for 
further moral examination.82      
                                                          
82 In a companion paper, Nigar Hashimzade and I discuss how attributing rent from the non-rival use of 
technology to the countries of users may be especially important in the future of labor-replacing artificial 
intelligence (AI). See Wei Cui & Nigar Hashimzade, The Digital Services Tax as a Tax on Location-
Specific Rent, CESifo Working Paper no. 7737 (CESifo Group Munich), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3321393.  
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In Part II, I stressed that the exercise of locating platform rent often does not lead one to 
the jurisdictions of consumers, and therefore the emphasis on countries of “user value creation” 
(interpreted in terms of platform LSR) in various governments’ justifications for the DST should 
not conflated with the view that more taxing rights should be allocated to “destination countries.” 
However, allocation by LSR and allocation by “destination” 83 differ not only in respect of 
results, but also, equally (or perhaps more) importantly, in terms of the nature of the arguments 
in favor of them. Allocation by LSR is supported by both efficiency and fairness arguments. 
Allocation by destination, however, has been promoted by its advocates only on efficiency 
grounds.84 Many have reacted to proposals of destination-based allocation by asking: what about 
the countries where things are produced—why shouldn’t those countries get a share of corporate 
profits?85 Despite this common reaction expressing a perception of the potential unfairness of 
destination-based allocations, their proponents have provided little by way of response.       
 Ultimately, any discussion of the desirable allocation of taxing rights among countries 
that does not speak to equity concerns is unlikely to hold up to scrutiny. It should be emphasized, 
therefore, that the method of identifying location specific rent that is used in this Article to 
motivate the DST inherently makes normative claims about equity.  
 Having made this important observation, I now turn, in the last Part, to the distribution 
and efficiency properties of the DST.   
                                                          
83 The meaning of “destination countries” remains unclear in proposals for destination-based profit 
allocation. See, e.g. Michael Devereux et al., Residual Profit Allocation by Income (Oxford U. Ctr. For 
Bus. Tax. Working Paper No. 19/01, 2019), https://eml.berkeley.edu/~auerbach/WP1901_0.pdf, where 
destination includes the countries both of consumer and of business purchasers.  
84 That is, assigning taxing rights over MNC profits by destination is supposed to remove incentives for 
socially wasteful international tax planning, reduce distortions to firm investment decisions caused by the 
current international tax regime, and (allegedly) introduce greater simplicity to tax design. 
85 Wei Cui, Destination-Based Cash-Flow Taxation: A Critical Appraisal, 67 U. TORONTO L.J. 301 
(2017). 
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IV. INCIDENCE AND EFFICIENCY PROPERTIES OF THE DST 
 Almost any tax imposed on digital platforms’ cross-border transactions—be it the DST, 
the traditional corporate income tax, the VAT or sales taxes, or various excise taxes—can be 
expected to have empirically complex effects. This is first because platforms by definition 
operate in markets characterized by imperfect competition. Very detailed information about 
demand elasticities appears necessary to predict how tax costs would be borne by platform firms, 
and/or passed through to others.86 Second, empirical complexity also arises because the 
measurement of rent is imperfect under both the income tax and any real-world rent taxes. So 
even taxes based on net income will be distortionary, again with complex incidence effects. 
Finally, understanding the welfare effect of distortionary taxes also requires one to take into 
account pre-existing distortions. For now, all that those interested in these aspects of tax policy 
can hope for is an approximately correct conceptual framework with which to evaluate future 
empirical findings.  
 This Part does not purport to provide that framework. Instead, even short of such a 
framework, I show that some common claims about the DST’s likely effects are ill-conceived. 
Two types of claims are particularly egregious. First are claims to the effect that the DST must 
be a bad tax because it is based on revenue, and thus can be imposed even when a platform 
company shows an accounting loss. Second are pronouncements that the cost of the DST will 
simply be passed onto the consumers of countries imposing it. Along the way in explaining the 
                                                          
86 Relevant empirical studies are also, not surprisingly, still rare: most new taxes on digital platforms are 
still merely proposed and not implemented. 
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falsehood of such claims, this Part also discusses a number of analytical considerations important 
for understanding the DST’s incidence and welfare effects.  
 
A. The Zero Marginal Cost Scenario and the Irrelevance of Accounting Losses 
A common feature of digital firms is that they operate with very low, often negligible, 
marginal costs. The placement of each ad, the facilitation of each online transaction, indeed the 
provision of digital content and much digital service to an additional customer, are largely 
automated with little additional labor and other input from the platform company, once the 
platform is running. This means that the revenue of a platform company from each additional 
transaction is essentially identical to its marginal profit from the transaction. A tax on revenue is 
approximately a tax on marginal profits. It follows that where zero marginal cost is a good 
approximation, the platform company’s marginal production and pricing decisions should be the 
same under a revenue tax or a profit tax.87 
When a platform’s marginal cost is not exactly zero, revenue taxation may affect a 
platform company’s business model. For example, if a tax on one side of the platform reduces 
profit earned from that side, the company may aim to shift its profit generation to the other side. 
Nonetheless, some theoretical models show that the platform may not try to shift the tax through 
price increases. One earlier study, for instance, demonstrates that when newspaper subscriptions 
are subject to taxation, the newspaper may lower (rather than raise) the price of subscription, 
                                                          
87 This point has been emphasized in most recent theoretical analyses of the taxation of digital platforms. 
See Marc Bourreau et al., Taxation of A Digital Monopoly Platform, 20 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 40 (2018), 
at 45-6; Jacques Cremer, Taxing Network Externalities, in TAXATION AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: A 
SURVEY OF THEORETICAL MODELS (France Stratégie, Feb. 26, 2015); Hans Jarle Kind & Marko 
Koethenbuerger, Taxation in Digital Media Markets, 20 J. PUB. ECON. THRY. 22 (2018), at 25, 34.  
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because doing so would (i) increase newspaper circulation, (ii) thereby attract additional 
advertisers and increase profit on the advertising side, and (iii) at the same time compensate 
readers for the increase in advertisement with the lower subscription price.88 More recent studies 
have demonstrated similar possibilities for platform firms that charge both users (through 
subscription fees) and advertisers and are subject to taxes on revenue on both sides.89  In these 
scenarios, one can say that the platform firm fully bears the burden of the tax.  
The preliminary nature of such existing theoretical analysis precludes policy-relevant 
predictions. Yet it is worth noting that all theoretical work focuses on how the profit-maximizing 
pricing strategy of the platform firm changes with the imposition of a revenue tax, in the 
presence of positive marginal cost. The idea that the firm makes a profit as a monopolist or 
oligopolist is not in question. Yet much of the outcry against DST proposals stresses that many 
platform companies are loss making or “have low profit margins.” Are the theorists simply out of 
touch?  
The answer, quite clearly, is “no.” Much of this is familiar from the taxation of natural 
resource extraction. Many governments impose gross-revenue-based royalty regimes in the 
natural resource sector. Suppose that a royalty is collected from the first dollar of oil that a firm 
extracts. This does not mean that the government has overestimated the profitability of that unit 
of the firm’s oil revenue, or that it mistook a low-margin business for a high-margin business. 
Rather, both the government and the oil-extraction firm expect the firm to earn monopoly rent 
over time. It is just the government does not want to wait until the firm recovers its upfront costs 
                                                          
88 Hans Jarle Kind et al., Tax Responses in Platform Industries, 62 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 764 (2010).  
89 Bourreau et al., supra note 87, at 47-50; Kind & Koethenbuerger, supra note 87, at 33. Although these 
scenarios are presented mostly as theoretical possibilities—there is as yet insufficient empirical 
information about key theoretical parameters for one to know whether these possibilities apply to the real 
world—numerical examples are given to illustrate their plausibility. 
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to collect revenue, and/or does not want to share the risk that the firm is exposed to from future 
price fluctuations.  Similarly, accounting profits/losses for platform firms can be simply 
uninformative about the “profit margin” of platform operations. Many platform firms incur large 
outlays to expand operations or to develop assets for generating future profits. High cost relative 
to revenue usually reflects high fixed costs, before the benefit from the economy of scale is fully 
realized. The slowness with which fixed costs are recovered explains the accounting losses (or 
“low profit margins”), but this is consistent with the marginal profitability of revenue generation, 
and the idea that the platform earns “quasi-rent” on sales.  
 Of course, governments should be concerned about imposing taxes that unduly 
discourage risk taking. Revenue taxes on resource extraction are characterized by some well-
known policy trade-offs, and some of these, though not all, apply in the platform context.90 We 
will return to these issues in the discussion of platform competition below. The points to be made 
here are simply that: (i) talks of platform firms as having “low profit margins” are misleading 
insofar as they suggest either that platforms have high marginal costs, or that platforms even 
price on the basis of marginal cost; and (ii) the expectation that a tax on platform rent should be 
imposed only when the platform “turns a profit” sets an arbitrary benchmark, one that is already 
rejected in real world practices of rent taxation.     
 
B. Pass-through of Positive Marginal Costs 
When platforms have positive marginal costs, on some platforms it is certainly possible, 
or even likely, for some of the cost of a tax on platform revenue (such as the DST) to be passed 
onto final consumers. Recent empirical work seems to show, for example, that the enforcement 
                                                          
90 For further discussion, see Cui and Hashimzade, supra note 82.  
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of sales and hotel taxes on transactions on AirBnB resulted in higher listing prices, with most of 
the burden of the taxes passed onto final consumers.91 Yet findings like this are consistent with 
both the underlying assumptions and the policy intent of a DST designed as a tax on LSR. In 
terms of underlying assumptions, the empirical evidence supports the supposition that in 
AirBnB’s business model, landlords are subsidized, and profit is made from charging guests.92 
Favorable pricing on the landlord side would be incompatible with passing the cost of tax 
collected by AirBnB onto landlords, whereas passing the cost of the tax onto guests is consistent 
with charging monopoly mark-ups on sales to the latter.  
In terms of policy intent, recall that the purpose of hotel taxes is to export the cost of 
local revenue to non-residents. The DST shares a similar purpose: it tries to claim a share of the 
portion of the consumer surplus that platforms like AirBnB extract from foreign consumers, 
which in turn may result in AirBnB asking for a greater portion of the consumer surplus. Such 
pass-throughs to final consumers would be a feature, not a bug, of DST design. 
There are other situations where claims that the DST would hurt consumers are  
implausible, rendering unnecessary any consideration of whether the pass-through effect on 
consumers is benign. Consider online advertising. In Part II, we have seen that Google and 
Facebook charge advertisers while subsidizing individual users of their search and social media 
functions. Passing the cost of the DST on advertising to individual users would not be a wise 
                                                          
91 Andrew J. Bibler, Keith F. Telster & Mark J. Tremblay, Inferring Tax Compliance from Pass-through: 
Evidence from Airbnb Tax Enforcement Agreements (2018); Eleanor Wilking, Hotel tax incidence with 
heterogeneous firm evasion: Evidence from airbnb remittance agreements (2016). None of these existing 
studies considers how such enforcement may have affected AirBnB’s own profitability.  
92 This supposition is also consistent with recent models studying the impact of AirBnB on local property 
prices. See Kyle Barron, Edward Kung & Davide Proserpio, The Sharing Economy and Housing 
Affordability: Evidence from AirBnB (2018).  
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response to the introduction of the DST, since it would simply reduce usage, which would in turn 
reduce all advertisers’ interest in the platform and therefore platform profit. Instead, Google or 
Facebook would be better off passing the DST cost (partially) to advertisers (assuming, even 
though it is theoretically possible,93 that they would not absorb the entire DST cost themselves). 
Some producers may find purchasing ad space on Google or Facebook no longer worth the 
money, but others will absorb the cost. Both suffer losses from the DST’s introduction. However, 
advertising costs represent fixed and not marginal costs of production. For producers facing 
competitive markets, increased advertising costs would reduce profits but not raise product 
prices.  
Note, in addition, that when online advertisers are foreign, DST-imposing countries may 
feel indifferent to cost pass-through by digital platforms. After all, these costs are borne because 
of expected producer surplus that has its origin in the DST imposing country! As with the case of 
cost pass-through to AirBnB guests, the taxing jurisdiction’s aim is to claim a share of location-
specific rent, however that rent is divided by the platform and its foreign users.  
 
 Of course, online advertisers often come from the same jurisdictions as the consumers 
they target. In these cases, it might be claimed that imposing the DST on online platforms merely 
hurts domestic producers, and nothing is accomplished by way of extracting rent from platforms 
themselves. Given certain assumptions about the DST and platform operations, this claim is 
incorrect. Suppose that the UK imposes the DST on all Facebook ads targeted at UK consumers, 
regardless of who places the ad. In addition, suppose that Facebook’s placement of advertising at 
UK residents has no opportunity cost in terms of targeting advertisement elsewhere. It follows 
                                                          
93 See sources cited in supra note 89.   
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that Facebook cannot dodge the DST by selling more UK-targeted ads to non-UK producers. Nor 
can it earn greater profit elsewhere by selling fewer UK-targeted ads. In this case, Facebook 
cannot benefit from reducing sales of advertising to UK producers by raising prices. That, of 
course, is the beauty of a tax on location-specific rent.  
 It is useful to contrast the DST in this regard with taxes on digital platforms aimed mainly 
at avoidance of traditional source-based income taxation—a distinction stressed in Part I.3.  One 
recent empirical study examines the impact of the implementation of the UK’s diverted profit tax 
(DPT) on Facebook’s advertising prices.94 Apparently, before the implementation of the DPT, 
Facebook booked most of its advertising revenue received from UK producers in Ireland, a low-
tax jurisdiction. When the DPT was adopted, Facebook began booking its revenue from UK 
advertisers in the UK, a high-tax jurisdiction. Prices for advertising space directed at users in the 
UK, as well as at users in countries where imports from the UK represent a large share of total 
imports, experienced a significant rise.95 In other words, advertisements purchased by UK 
producers became more expensive.  
This can be explained by a theoretical model in which the digital platform decides to 
place ads from producers from two different countries, one with high tax and one with low tax. 
When profit from selling advertising to the high tax country becomes less profitable (due to a 
higher profit tax), the platform may try to increase advertising revenue from the other country 
                                                          
94 A. Cuevas et al., The Taxman Calls. How Does Facebook Answer? Global Effects of Taxation on 
Online Advertising (NET Instit., Working Paper #17-09, Sept. 2017).  
95 Id. 
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instead. This way, the total number of ads placed on the platform does not increase, which helps 
the platform avoid alienating its users with excessive advertising.96  
It is reasonable to expect that the UK DST’s impact on Facebook, however, would be 
different from the impact of the DPT. The DST would tax all Facebook revenue from 
advertisement targeted at UK consumers. And it would not tax Facebook revenue from 
advertisement targeted at consumers elsewhere. Under such a tax, Facebook would not have the 
choice, as in the above model, of maximizing profit by choosing among advertisers from 
different countries: the DST would be imposed (when ads are targeted at UK users) or not (when 
ads are targeted elsewhere) regardless of the location of the ad purchasers. 
To be sure, it is important to acknowledge that current DST proposals, when applied to 
online intermediation, do not distinguish between users from jurisdictions in which rent arises 
(generally the subsidized sides) and users elsewhere. When the DST is levied on transactions that 
do not correspond to rent in the levying jurisdiction, it may hurt domestic consumers or 
businesses without any impact on MNC profits. This critique of the DST would simply parallel 
well-known critiques of source-based corporate taxation. Indeed, the DPT is an income tax and 
not a tax on revenue. It is not specifically targeted at digital platforms, and simply tries to 
reinforce traditional source-based corporate taxation (by effectively expanding the definition of 
PE). Any analogy between the DST and DPT would go to show that when the DST is not 
designed to track LSR, it may take on the flaws of traditional source-based taxation. But what 
this implies is that the DST cannot be improved by making it more like the traditional income 
tax, for example by changing it to conform to the EC “long-term solution,” which expands 
                                                          
96 Id. Cuevas et al. conclude that if countries are generally interested in imposing taxes like the DPT on 
digital platforms, they are better off coordinating, since governments unilaterally adopting source-based 
taxes are likely to set tax rates too low. 
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source-based taxation through introducing the concept of significant digital presence. Economic 
analysis suggests rather the opposite. 
 
C. Impact on Platform Competition 
None of the foregoing arguments in support of the DST deny a basic problem: the DST as 
a revenue tax does not take the fixed cost of platform operations into account; nor does it take 
into account the cost of research and development that generated the technologies enabling the 
platforms in the first place. It may thus well generate inefficient investment incentives and 
produce welfare losses in the long term.  
Even here, though, there is a fundamental complication: the incentives for investing in 
platforms in a tax-free world may be socially inefficient. Consider the following narrative, 
which, even if not entirely accurate, likely contains a grain of truth.  The reason why platform 
companies often incur years of substantial losses is due not to their marginal costs, but to fixed 
costs. Businesses incur such fixed costs in the expectation of eventually making a profit. Indeed, 
investors in some platform companies seem willing to “burn money” through a (sometimes long) 
initial stretch, in a gambit to build market power and eventually earn monopoly or oligopolistic 
rent.97 The value of such spending to capture market share accrues mainly to one firm; it has no 
value for competing firms. In other words, competition in markets occupied by platforms is 
plagued by the problem of excessive search, where the private value of search efforts exceeds its 
social value. A tax on firm revenue in such contexts would diminish such socially inefficient 
incentives. It is indeed a standard solution for the problem of excessive search.   
                                                          
97 Khan, supra note 54.  
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 An important strand of current research on platform competition supports this narrative. 
Glen Weyl and Alexander White, for instance, have suggested that many of the markets platform 
companies occupy are characterized by ease of entry, with many viable strategies for entrants to 
undermine incumbents.98  These markets are therefore more likely to be characterized by 
excessive fragmentation than by quick lock-ins for (potentially inefficient) first movers. In such 
markets, a major source of inefficiency is excessive investment in the competition to capture 
monopoly rent. A tax on investment, in the form of either a tax on revenue or a tax on income 
without compensation for losses, can improve social welfare by deterring such over-
investment.99  
This raises the general issue of how to evaluate investment incentives. It is tempting to 
draw a distinction between “good” investments in technology on the one hand, and venture 
capitalists burning money out of greed to capture monopoly rent, on the other. Yet much R&D is 
also characterized by both positive and negative externalities (the latter because of the possibility 
of excessive search). The role of tax policy in correcting inefficient investment incentives clearly 
requires a better understanding of these inefficiencies. Supposing that inefficient investment 
incentives are of concern in the context of platform competition, however, the issue is relevant 
not only for the justification of the DST but also for its design. For example, exempting smaller 
platforms from the DST may have the negative effect of inducing greater market fragmentation, 
                                                          
98 E. Glen Weyl & Alexander White, Let the Best ‘One’ Win: Policy Lessons from the New Economics of 
Platforms (Coase-Sandor Instit. for Law and Econ. Working Paper No. 709, Dec. 2014);   
99 See also Cremer, supra note 87, at 11-13 (the larger is the value of users to platform companies when 
compared to the value of quality (which requires costly investment) for the consumers, the more 
incentives firms will have to overinvest, in which case a profit tax without compensation for losses can be 
welfare-improving).  
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and this could be the case regardless of whether the exemption threshold is designed as a kink or 
a notch.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 In this Article I have laid out a conception of platform LSR that offers strong 
justifications for recent proposals for implementing a DST. This conception of platform LSR 
relies on two core insights. The first is that indirect network effects in two-sided business models 
may create systematic mis-alignments between value creation and the source of payment, and 
platform rent can plausibly be attributed to the side of the platform that is subsidized (to which 
the platform can then offer users on the other side monopoly access). The second is that rents 
accruing to platform technology, whether they arise from direct or indirect network effects, from 
personalization, or from data, should be attributed to the jurisdictions of users when the use of 
the technology is non-rival. Both insights, I believe, are new to discussions of the design of 
international taxation. DST proposals represent a genuine innovation in tax policy design in 
leveraging these two new insights. 
 Interpreting the DST as a tax on platform LSR has the effect of sharpening the distinction 
between DST proposals and other broad themes in recent international tax policy debates. One 
such theme is reforming international business income taxation. I have argued that the traditional 
design of international business income taxation has not focused on LSR. Nor is there agreement 
that taxing LSR should be a core objective in reforming income taxation. This raises the 
possibility that the policy motivations of the DST are simply orthogonal to those associated with 
income taxation. Recognizing this possibility would certainly create cognitive dissonance for 
those accustomed to the teleological narrative that the DST will merely be replaced by an 
improved system of international income taxation. If the intuitions motivating the DST are valid, 
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they generate a normative perspective from which many international tax reform proposals—
whether currently existing or still to come—will likely continue to be impugned. 
 Another theme in recent debates is destination-based apportionment, either of all 
corporate profits or of residual profits. Advocates of destination-based apportionment sometimes 
even claim that ideas about “user value creation” simply represent an inchoate, ad hoc version of 
the scheme of destination-based apportionment. The arguments in this Article suggest, in 
contrast, that when “user value creation” is interpreted in terms of platform LSR, it is not about 
allocation of profits to “destination” countries at all. Moreover, it is destination-based 
apportionment that suffers from an inchoate normative position, whereas taxing rents where they 
arise represents a more fully fleshed-out normative view, in that it takes both efficiency and 
equity considerations into account.  
Research on the industrial organization of digital platforms has revealed a rich variety of 
ways in which platforms can earn supra-normal profits. Both theoretically and empirically, 
platform LSR is by no means limited to the types of businesses (advertising, online 
intermediation, and sale of data) that current DST proposals select to be their targets. However, 
there is also something very striking about these business models that activate one’s intuitions 
about LSR in a very effective way. Fortunately, the line-drawing that current DST proposals 
necessarily engage in has not only ample pragmatic justifications but also plenty of precedents in 
all areas of tax policy.     
